

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 2, 1973


Dear Dave:

Thank you for your letter of January 14 concerning post-hostilities aid to both Vietnams. This is clearly a matter which we will be seriously considering as we proceed in implementing the terms of the Agreement.

As I indicated in my press conference of January 24, we intend to discuss the issue of economic reconstruction of all of Indochina, including North Vietnam, once the implementation of the Agreement is well advanced, and the definition of any particular sum will have to await these discussions.

Your offer to help and your willingness to share your thoughts with us are deeply appreciated.

Warm regards,


Henry A. Kissinger

*Do let me know when you
come to Washington. It
has been too long since
we talked.*

Dr. David Riesman
Harvard University
Department of Sociology
William James Hall 380
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

January 27, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER
FROM: JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE /S/
SUBJECT: David Riesman Correspondence on
Post-Hostilities Aid to Both Vietnams

David Riesman of Harvard has written to you offering his and Clark Kerr's services in a civilian lobby to press for aid to both Vietnams (Tab B).

Attached at Tab A is our recommended reply for your signature thanking Dr. Riesman for his offer and explaining that we will be considering this matter as we proceed in implementing the terms of the agreement but that we do not intend to discuss the issue of economic reconstruction of all of Indochina until after the implementation of the agreement is well advanced.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter to Dr. Riesman at Tab A.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

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William James Hall 380
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
14 January 1973

Mr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Henry:

Clark Kerr and I have, as you know, kept in touch over these last years on the Viet Nam issue through the Negotiations Now group that he heads. We have always believed that there would have to be negotiations for any kind of viable settlement; that they would be intricate; that one had to think about many messy and problematic details. Recently I have been in touch with him about one issue which, we could imagine, must be a very troubling one for you, even though at the moment peripheral: namely, how to assure either North or South Viet Nam, or any possible confederation, the American support for reconstruction that must be an element of any settlement.

One can imagine the political difficulty from the political Right, many of whom are hawks barely converted to frustrated doves, over any effort to give American money to any country, but especially to North Viet Nam. I can also envisage a good deal of hostility on the part of liberals and doves when it comes to giving money to the Thieu government of South Viet Nam; the covert patronization of South Vietnamese by supposed anti-racists must be one of the ironies you have thought about. I have in front of me Pat Moynihan's new book, The Politics of a Guaranteed Income, and I followed and lived through the dreadful way in which that marvelous measure was killed in the Senate by a combination of traditional fiscal and often Southern conservatives and Northern "friends of the poor and the black."

It seems to me that much of the political process in 1972 on the national and state and local levels consisted of people screaming that they were paying too many taxes and feeling sorry for themselves--in what is still much the richest country in the world. And you and I have talked before about what I have come to call the reprovincialization of America, or its domestication, in which only internal problems concern our most avant-garde and conscience-stricken people. Clark Kerr and I agree that it will be important, or may be important to have some kind of civilian lobby available to press for aid to both Viet Nams if that should turn out to be an element of the settlement. As a nationally-known Friend and a person (as I see in our Carnegie Commission meetings) of exemplary skill at press conferences, Clark Kerr is the person who could well undertake such an effort and recognizes its necessity, or possible necessity.

I say this while of course realizing the multi-national nature of the enterprise, the eagerness of the Japanese to help (for all sorts of reasons), etc. But I also say this out of the conviction that the healing process in the United States itself, which has concerned the President and you from the very beginning, may be helped or hindered by the way the issue of aid to Southeast Asia is handled. I have even thought of the kind of political formulae that one might have in mind, e.g., would per capita aid satisfy North Viet Nam, and also the American majority? I think an argument could even be made for per capita aid on the ground that there has been more real destruction of social units in South than in North Viet Nam.

But mostly, I wanted
about this issue and prepared to help

Mr. Kissinger

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14 January 1973

I appreciated your Christmas card, and Evey joins in greetings.

Sincerely,


David Riesman

DR/mg